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OF PARDONS, POLITICS AND
COLLAR BUTTONS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
DUTY TO BE MERCIFUL
Margaret Colgate Love*
[Pardon] has never been crystallized into rigid rules. Rather, its
function has been to break rules. It has been the safety valve by
which harsh, unjust, or unpopular results of formal rules could be
corrected.'
INTRODUCION
Few provisions in the Constitution are as misunderstood and un-
derestimated as the President's power to pardon.2 Most people to-
day associate pardons with politics and controversy, and do not
know that for much of our nation's history the pardon power was
exercised regularly and without fanfare to give relief to ordinary
people convicted of garden-variety federal crimes. Once an inte-
gral part of the justice system, pardon is considered anachronistic
in an age devoted to rules and wary of discretion, a vestige of a
simpler time whose occasional exercise is either capricious or
pointless, or both. Indeed, until quite recently the prevailing view
among criminal justice practitioners and philosophers was that the
* Lecturer in Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. I wish to thank Kathleen Dean Moore for her comments on an earlier draft
of this article. Many of the opinions expressed in this article and some of its back-
ground information are the product of my seven years' service as Pardon Attorney in
the Department of Justice, from 1990 to 1997.
1. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PARDON 295 (1939) [hereinafter SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES].
2. "The President shall.., have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Of-
fences against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1. Sixty years ago, the introduction to what is still the only systematic study
of the federal pardon power noted that "the vast majority of people have a very hazy
idea of the meaning and of the implications of the President's pardoning power. The
persistence of erroneous ideas, the lack of exact information, and the absence of pub-
licity concerning the acts of the pardoning authority envelop the power in a veil of
mystery." W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 6 (1941). In
the intervening years, and notwithstanding episodic scholarly interest in particular
sensational grants, the public understanding of the pardon power has changed very
little, and constitutional texts devote little space to it. See, e.g., P. SHANE & H. BRUFF,
THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1988) (discussing pardon power on four of 811
pages of text).
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time had come for pardon "silently to fade away - like collar but-
tons, [its] usefulness at an end." 3
At the same time, the intense competition for partisan advantage
in matters touching on crime control has made pardoning politi-
cally problematic. This was brought home to the Clinton Adminis-
tration in the summer of 1999 by the public furor that greeted the
President's offer of clemency4 to sixteen members of a Puerto Ri-
can nationalist group ("FALN") who were serving lengthy prison
sentences for terrorist offenses. The President defended his deci-
sion in terms of "equity and fairness,"5 but it was widely criticized
as a thinly-veiled attempt to curry favor with Hispanic voters in
New York on behalf of his wife's expected Senate candidacy.6
Given the great risk and uncertain return of pardoning, it seems
less surprising that the President does it rarely than that he does it
at all. But the concern for political risk threatens to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy: as the power is exercised less and less fre-
quently and produces fewer and fewer grants, it is more and more
likely to be regarded with suspicion and cynicism.
It is unfortunate that the federal pardon power seems to have
fallen into disuse and disrepute just when it appears that it might
once again prove useful. The harsh inflexibility that has come to
3. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST 84 (1989); see also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting
the Pardoning Power From the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 604, 611 (1991) [hereinafter
Kobil, Quality of Mercy] (the clemency power has been "trivialized," having "failed to
evolve with the rest of the judicial system"). Both Moore and Kobil argue for a revi-
talized role for pardon as an "extrajudicial corrective" for unjust outcomes of the
legal system. See infra note 70.
4. The term "clemency" is a comprehensive term that has come to be used for all
types of relief available pursuant to the pardon power, to avoid confusion with the
narrower technical use of the term "pardon" in the Justice Department's clemency
regulations which denotes the limited grant of relief after completion of sentence. See
Executive Clemency, 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2000). Clemency includes commutation of sen-
tence, reprieve, and remission of fine, as well as full or unconditional pardon. The
term "amnesty" is usually used where a grant of clemency is extended by proclama-
tion to a class of individuals. Throughout this paper I have also used the constitu-
tional term "pardon" in this same comprehensive sense, though I have attempted,
where appropriate, to distinguish it from the post-sentence relief described in the Jus-
tice Department's clemency regulations.
5. Letter from the President to the Honorable Henry Waxman, Ranking Minor-
ity Member, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 21, 1999) [hereinafter FALN
Letter] (copy on file with author).
6. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, Ex-Clinton Lawyer Says Politics Had No Role in
Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A10; Katherine Q. Seelye, Clinton Says
Clemency Plan Was Unrelated to First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1999, at B4; David
Johnston, Federal Agencies Opposed Leniency for 16 Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1999, at Al.
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characterize the federal criminal justice system in the past two de-
cades is becoming a matter of public concern, in part because of
"hard cases" in which the legally mandated punishment seems
morally wrong, and in part because of a growing crime control in-
frastructure that reflects poorly on our national humanity. Also,
for the first time in many years, questions about the role of clem-
ency in capital cases are being raised at the federal level. There are
many who believe that it is time to declare victory in our thirty-
year war on crime, assess its costs, and begin the work of reconcili-
ation. In this connection, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look
at the presidential pardon power in the constitutional scheme.7
The FALN grants, along with several other recent clemency ac-
tions by President Clinton, are a hopeful sign that reports of par-
don's death are greatly exaggerated. In this Article, I hope to
contribute to its recovery by proposing that the President has a
duty to pardon, not so much to do justice in particular cases, but to
be merciful as a more general obligation of office. As background,
I will briefly describe how in recent years the President's pardoning
power has come to be neglected. In a final section I will suggest
some ways in which the President can revive the power by making
a more considered and generous use of it.
A. The Evolving Role of Federal Pardons
What Alexander Hamilton called the "benign prerogative of par-
doning"'has two quite different but equally public aspects. The
first is to permit the President to dispense "the mercy of the gov-
ernment" where the outcome dictated by law seems harsh or un-
just.9 The second is to enable him to deal expeditiously with
7. See Editorial, Wrong Way on Pardons, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2000, at A22
[hereinafter Wrong Way on Pardons] ("The Founders envisioned [the pardon power]
as a robust political check on a criminal justice system that would inevitably produce
excesses. With tremendous growth in the reach of federal criminal law, the need is
greater than ever. Yet as this growth has taken place, the practice has withered.");
Editorial, The President's Pardons, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1999, at A24 ("Given the
harsh mandatory minimum sentences that govern drug offenses, including nonviolent
offenses, there must be many cases where presidential clemency would be a powerful
tool for justice. The president should not routinely second-guess the court system.
But given the desultory use of this constitutional power over the past 20 years, there
seems to be no danger of that. The danger, rather, is that a valuable check on the
justice system has wilted into symbolism.").
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed.,
1987).
9. Id. ("The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary sever-
ity that, without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel."); James Iredell, Address in the
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situations involving political upheavals or emergencies.' 0 The par-
don power is not subject to limitation by Congress" or the courts, 2
and the President is held accountable for its exercise only through
the political process.13 It has always been assumed (though evi-
dently never authoritatively decided) that the power to pardon is
one of the very few whose exercise the President may not delegate
to a subordinate official, and in fact no President has ever tried.14
North Carolina Ratifying Convention, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
17 (P. Kurland and R. Lerner, eds., 1987) [hereinafter Iredell Address] ("[T]here may
be many instances where, though a man offends against the letter of the law, yet
peculiar circumstances in his case may entitle him to mercy. It is impossible for any
general law to foresee and provide for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore
an inflexible adherence to it, in every instance, might frequently be the cause of very
great injustice.").
10. Hamilton considered the utility of pardon in case of domestic disorder: "[I]n
seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments when a well-
timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the
commonwealth, and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall." THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 8, at 423. Iredell also
mentioned pardon's usefulness in time of "civil war," and added the need to obtain
the testimony of accomplices and to protect spies who have proved useful to the gov-
ernment. See Iredell Address, supra note 9, at 18.
11. See In re Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) ("This [pardon] power of the Presi-
dent is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his
pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.").
12. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998) ("Pardon
and commutation have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are
rarely, if ever, decisions appropriate subjects for judicial review" (quoting Connecti-
cut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981))); In re Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 121 (1925) ("[W]hoever is to make [pardon] useful must have full discretion to use
it"); see also Yelvington v. Presidential Pardon and Parole Attorneys, 211 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (the court will not compel compliance with internal Justice Depart-
ment clemency regulations so as to interfere with administration of pardon power).
13. Proposals during the Constitutional Convention that the power be shared with
Congress were rejected on grounds of efficiency, and on the theory that the Presi-
dent's personal accountability to the electorate was a sufficient check on abuses. See
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 419 (Aug. 25, 1787) (statement of
Sherman) (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (rejecting proposals to allow reprieves until the en-
suing session of the Senate, and to condition pardon on the consent of the Senate); id.
at 626-27 (rejecting proposal to vest the power to pardon treason jointly in the Presi-
dent and the Senate); see also William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 501-06 (1977) [hereinafter
Duker, President's Power]. Hamilton argued that the pardon power was vested in
"one man" rather than "a body of men" for two reasons: first, "the sense of responsi-
bility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided," and second, "as men gener-
ally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in
an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or
censure for an injudicious or affected clemency." THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note
8, at 422-23.
14. Cf TERRY SANFORD, MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOV-
ERNOR TERRY SANFORD, 1961-65, 552 (1966), quoted in Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribu-
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The public is most familiar with the occasions throughout our
history when the pardon power was used for purposes of calming
and unifying the country after a period of strife, notably the amnes-
ties that have followed almost every one of our wars.' 5 President
Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon, which cost Ford his own political
future, is properly regarded as a legitimate measure to restore what
Hamilton called "the tranquility of the commonwealth.' 1 6 Other
examples of pardons granted in whole or in part for political pur-
poses are President Jackson's pardon of the Barataria pirates as a
reward for their assistance in defending New Orleans in the War of
1812,17 President Cleveland's pardon of Mormon settlers in Utah
to shield them from prosecution for polygamy,' s President Nixon's
conditional commutation of Jimmy Hoffa's prison sentence barring
tion and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 75 CHI. KENT L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with author) ("To decide when and
where such mercy should be extended is a decision which must be made by the execu-
tive. It cannot be delegated even in part to anyone else, and thus the decision is a
lonely one. It falls to the Governor to blend mercy with justice as best he can, involv-
ing human as well as legal considerations, in the light of all circumstances after the
passage of time, but before justice is allowed to overrun mercy in the name of the
power of the state.").
15. Perhaps best known are the great Civil War pardon proclamations of Presi-
dents Lincoln and Johnson. See DUKER, supra note 13, at 509-21. Also well known
are the amnesties issued by Presidents Ford and Carter to persons guilty of military
and selective service violations following the Vietnam War. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975) [hereinafter CLEMENCY
BOARD REPORT]; Proclamation No. 4483, 3 C.F.R. 4 (1978); see also Kent Greena-
walt, Vietnam Amnesty - Problems of Justice and Line-Drawing, 11 GA. L. REV. 1
(1976). In addition, Washington used the pardon power to pacify the Whiskey Rebels
in 1794-95; see 1 Annals of Congress 1411-1413; Adams also used the pardon power to
bring an end to the Tariff Insurrection in 1800, see 1 Annals of Congress 1552-53; and,
Madison used it on three separate occasions during the War-of 1812 to persuade de-
serters from the army to return to service. See JAMES D. RICHARDSON, 2 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 413, 497, 528 (1897)
[hereinafter RICHARDSON, MESSAGES]; see also BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMNESTY IN
AMERICA 22-24 (Morris Sherman ed., 1974). The pardon power was also used, as it
had been in England, to man the military. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 341, 342 (1820).
Presidents Wilson and Truman both issued a number of pardons to mark the end of
the two world wars. See CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT, supra, at 374-79.
16. Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (rejecting chal-
lenge to pardon based on both timing and merits). See also Stephen L. Carter, The
Iran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29 Hous. L. REV. 883, 887 (1992) ("Although our national
anger seemed to demand punishment for Nixon's crimes, Ford believed that in the
long run, the national interest would be better served by enabling the ex-President to
avoid prosecution, leaving him untouched by legal proceedings that would otherwise
have kept alive our national obsession with Watergate, which, in retrospect, it was
plainly time to put aside.").
17. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, supra note 15, at 543-45.
18. See JAMES D. RICHARDSON, 13 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENT 5942 (1897).
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him from union management after his release from prison, 19 and
President Reagan's commutation of a foreign spy's life sentence in
contemplation of a "swap" for several of our nationals imprisoned
abroad.2" Considerations of politics also underlay President Bush's
Iran-Contra pardons,21 as they did Jefferson's pardon of those con-
victed and sentenced during the preceding Federalist period under
the Alien and Sedition Act.22
What is less well-known is that the pardon power has also been
exercised by the President over the years on a more mundane and
less visible level, to make exceptions to the law in a wide variety of
circumstances. The archival records of clemency actions from
George Washington's administration onwards reveal the frequent
use of the pardon power to cut short a prison sentence, to delay an
execution, to return forfeited property, and to restore civil rights.23
For much of our history, several hundred pardons or commutations
were routinely granted each year, most generating little public in-
terest.2 4 While there have been colorful clemency recipients in
every period of our history - such as Eugene Debs, Tokyo Rose,
19. Hoffa was unaware of the condition in the commutation warrant, inserted by
White House Counsel John Dean, until after he had been released from prison, and
sued to declare it unenforceable. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1223-24 (D.C.
1974). His appeal of the district court's decision against him was dismissed after he
disappeared and was presumed dead. See Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Par-
dons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon
Power Been Exceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1976).
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, WARRANTS
OF PARDON, 1935-1999, Exec. Grant of Clemency to Marian W. Zacharski, June 7,
1985 [hereinafter WARRANTS OF PARDON].
21. See Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992) (recipients of pardon
among "the best and most dedicated of our countrymen," who were motivated by
patriotism and not by hope of private gain, and whose prosecution resulted from the
"criminalization of policy differences").
22. See Duker, President's Power, supra note 13, at 530; Kobil, Quality of Mercy,
supra note 3, at 593.
23. Portions of these records from 1794 to 1935 are on microfilm in the Office of
the Pardon Attorney. That office also retains the original pardon warrants from the
first administration of Franklin Roosevelt until the present, as well as the originals of
many pardon recommendations signed by the Attorney General addressed to the
President. See WARRANTS OF PARDON, supra note 20. While pardon warrants are
public records, pardon recommendations are generally not disclosed by the Depart-
ment of Justice, even where a subject is deceased. Clemency case files are acceded to
the National Archives on a regular basis in accordance with established records poli-
cies, except for a few involving notorious individuals or issues of special interest, and
most are destroyed after a certain period of time.
24. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY ACTIONS
BY FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 1900 TO JUNE 20, 1945 (Mar. 24, 1999); PRESIDENTIAL
CLEMENCY ACTIONS BY ADMINISTRATION, 1945 TO PRESENT (Feb. 1, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter, collectively, OPA CLEMENCY ACTIONS].
1488
2000] PRESIDENT'S DUTY TO BE MERCIFUL
George Steinbrenner, Patty Hearst, and Marvin Mandel - the vast
majority of pardons have gone unnoticed and unremarked.
Reflecting the pardon power's historically close ties with the op-
eration of the criminal justice system, its administration has been
entrusted to the Attorney General since the middle of the nine-
teenth century. 2 He is assisted by the Pardon Attorney, who is
responsible for accepting and reviewing clemency applications and
preparing recommendations for their disposition. 6 At least since
the beginning of the twentieth century, with only a handful of ex-
ceptions, the President has made each clemency grant pursuant to
a report and recommendation drafted by the Pardon Attorney and
signed by the Attorney General or his designee.27 In fact, pardon
25. Until 1853, the Department of State administered the pardon power, perhaps
reflecting the power's frequent early use to restore forfeited property and remit fines.
A copy of each warrant was kept in longhand, as well as a separate ledger book con-
taining a brief description of the offense being pardoned, and the reasons for the
grant. Pardons that had the effect of cutting short a prison sentence were generally
made pursuant to the recommendation of the prosecutor or sentencing judge. After
1854 the administration of the pardon power was shifted to the Attorney General,
though warrants were still drawn up in the State Department. In 1893 President
Cleveland by executive order formally transferred all administrative duties in pardon
matters to the Attorney General. See Exec. Order of June 16, 1893 (on file at the
Office of the Pardon Attorney). See also Reed Cozart, Clemency Under the Federal
System, 13 FEDERAL PROBATION 3 & n.1 (1959). The first Justice Department clem-
ency regulations, signed by both the Attorney General and the President, were issued
in 1898. A complete set of clemency regulations, from the 1898 McKinley regulations
to the current regulations approved by President Clinton in 1993, is on file at the
Office of the Pardon Attorney.
26. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35-0.36 (1983). In 1865 Congress appropriated funds to pay
a "pardon clerk" to assist the Attorney General, and in 1891 the first Pardon Attor-
ney was appointed. See 13 Stat. 516 (1865); 26 Stat. 946 (1891). The Pardon Attorney
reported directly to the Attorney General until the late 1970s, when Attorney Gen-
eral Griffin Bell delegated responsibility for clemency matters, and supervisory au-
thority over the Office of the Pardon Attorney, to the Deputy Attorney General. See
Interview with Terrence B. Adamson, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
1977-1979, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2, 2000). Since 1983 the Attorney General's
responsibility for providing advice to the President in clemency matters has been dele-
gated to the Pardon Attorney, but recommendations to the President are generally
signed by the Deputy Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.35 (Attorney General re-
sponsibility delegated to Pardon Attorney, whose clemency recommendations are
made "through" the Deputy Attorney General). During most of the 1980s, the Asso-
ciate Attorney General was responsible for supervising the criminal components of
the Department, and for approving and signing clemency recommendations; in 1989,
this responsibility was returned to the Deputy Attorney General, where it has
remained.
27. By the late 1930s, the Attorney General was too busy with other matters to
prepare a separate recommendation to the President in any but the most important or
controversial clemency cases, and usually simply "endorsed" the recommendation of
the Pardon Attorney. See HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 90 n.15. At some later point,
probably during the Kennedy administration, the practice of having these "letters of
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warrants often incorporate a reference to the Justice Department's
recommendation. The degree to which the President has histori-
cally depended upon the Attorney General's advice in clemency
matters is suggested by the fact that, until the Kennedy Adminis-
tration, most applications that the Attorney General did not sup-
port were not even forwarded to the White House, but closed
administratively without presidential action in the Pardon Attor-
ney's office.28
Until the early 1920s, the pardon power was used most fre-
quently to commute a prison term, often because of some miscar-
riage of justice or equitable defect in the underlying conviction, but
more commonly because the prisoner was simply deemed to have
served sufficient time in prison.29 With the advent of indetermi-
advice" personally signed by the Attorney General resumed. In addition, during the
Kennedy administration, reports in summary form recommending denial of clemency
(also signed by the Attorney General) were sent to the President. Previously, most
cases in which the Department did not recommend favorable action had been closed
administratively by the Pardon Attorney. See 1963 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 63 jhere-
inafter 1963 AG ANNUAL REPORT]. The Attorney General personally signed all
clemency recommendations until about midway through the Carter Administration,
when the Deputy Attorney General assumed this responsibility. See Interview with
Terence B. Adamson, supra note 26.
28. See 1963 AG ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 63.
29. While in modern times the President has not usually disclosed his reasons for
granting a pardon, the early pardon ledger books and the annual reports of the Attor-
ney General between 1885 and 1931 record each clemency grant with the reasons for
recommending relief. Many of these involve doubt as to guilt, lack of capacity, or
excuse - a reminder of how relatively primitive our early justice system was. Some-
times the reasons for a favorable recommendation involve the prisoner's age or health
(fear of contagion was as likely as imminent death to qualify a prisoner for early
release) or immigration status (pardon to "avert deportation"); sometimes they re-
flect operational considerations like reward or immunity; sometimes they depend
upon an official recommendation, including that of prison officials; and sometimes
they are simply quaint (e.g., "to enable petitioner to catch steamer without delay," "to
enable farmer prisoner to save his crops," and "not of criminal type"). See HUMBERT,
supra note 2, at 124-33. The range of reasons reveals the idiosyncratic sense of com-
passion in the recommending official. For example, Attorney General Charles J. Bo-
naparte observed in 1908 that:
I have always considered with especial care the possible claims to clemency
of unenlightened and apparently friendless criminals, particularly those
whose crimes might have been the fruits of sudden and violent passion, igno-
rance, poverty, or unhappy surroundings and to deal less favorably with ap-
plications on behalf of offenders enjoying at the time of the crime good
social position, material comforts, the benefits of education, and a happy
domestic life.
1908 ATr'VY GEN. ANN. REP. 8. Unfortunately, after 1931 these fascinating records
were no longer compiled and published for reasons of efficiency, and they exist now
only in the uncatalogued letters of advice signed by the Attorney General on file in
the Pardon Attorney's office, a treasure trove for interested scholars. It has been
Department policy for many years not to divulge the basis for its clemency recom-
1490
PRESIDENT'S DUTY TO BE MERCIFUL
nate sentencing and an administrative parole system, as well as
greater opportunity to appeal convictions through the courts, par-
don no longer played such a central operational role as a post-con-
viction remedy.30
While there were fewer commutations after 1930, however, post-
sentence pardons "to restore civil rights" remained a popular way
for the President to recognize and further the rehabilitation of
criminals who had served their sentence and returned to a produc-
tive life in their communities. 31 Between 1932 and 1980, there
were well over a hundred post-sentence pardons granted almost
every year; in some years, the President signed more than 300 sepa-
rate pardon warrants. 32 These grants were generally made on a
mendations in particular cases, though general standards are set forth in sections 1-
2.112 (pardon) and 1-2.113 (commutation) of the U.S. Attorney's Manual.
30. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 1, at 296 ("Are not judicial
review and modern release procedures like parole sufficient to do all that pardon ever
did - and do it better? To a large extent the answer must be yes.").
31. Under the Justice Department's first clemency rules promulgated in 1898 and
continuing to the present, eligibility to apply for a post-sentence pardon depends
upon satisfaction of a waiting period after release from prison (originally "a consider-
able period," and now five years). Unless granted for innocence, a pardon has no
implications for the validity of the underlying conviction, and the-conviction remains
on an individual's record to be reported whenever requested. However, a presiden-
tial pardon removes disabilities imposed as a result of conviction under federal or
state law. See Memorandum for Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, Office of
Pardon Attorney, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re: Effect of a Presidential Pardon 1 (June 19, 1995)
(presidential pardon relieves a federal offender of state firearms disabilities that at-
tach solely by reason of a federal conviction); cf. In re Elliott Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 9-
18 (D.C. 1997) (holding that presidential pardon did not nullify court's authority to
impose professional discipline based on conduct underlying the conviction). For some
illustrations of the post-sentence benefits sought and gained through the pardon pro-
cess, see Cozart, supra note 25, at 5-6; see also Henry Allen, Uh, Pardon Me, Mr.
President, Caspar & Co. Weren't the Only Ones Let Off the Hook Last Week, WASH.
POST, Jan. 1, 1993, at D1; Ted Gup, For Seekers of Forgiveness at Lofty Levels, A
Presidential Pardon, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1987, at A21.
32. See OPA CLEMENCY ACTIONS, supra note 24. Franklin Roosevelt issued a
total of 2721 pardons, commuted 491 prison sentences and remitted fines in 475 cases;
Truman commuted 133 sentences and issued 1911 pardons. Eisenhower commuted 47
sentences and pardoned 1110 individuals; Kennedy commuted 103 sentences and
pardoned 472 individuals; Johnson commuted 228 sentences and granted 959 pardons;
Nixon commuted 63 sentences and granted 863 pardons; Ford commuted 27 sentences
and granted 381 pardons; and Carter commuted 32 sentences and granted 534 par-
dons. See id. (numbers of commutations include both commutations and fine remis-
sions). Until the Eisenhower Administration, each pardon grant was evidenced by its
own separate warrant signed by the President. President Eisenhower began the prac-
tice of granting pardons by the batch, through the device of a "master warrant" listing
all of the names of those pardoned, which also delegated to the Attorney General (or,
later, the Deputy Attorney General or Pardon Attorney) authority to sign individual
warrants evidencing the President's action. All but a few pardons today are granted
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regular basis through the year, evidence that the business of par-
doning was regarded as part of the ordinary housekeeping work of
the Presidency.33 More significantly, the percentage of pardon pe-
titions acted on favorably remained high, approaching or exceeding
thirty percent in every administration from Franklin Roosevelt's to
Jimmy Carter's. 34 Even the number of commutations remained
surprisingly high throughout this period, given the availability of
alternative early release mechanisms like parole.
During the Reagan Administration the number of clemency
grants each year began to dwindle, both in absolute terms and rela-
tive to the total number of applications acted on. President Rea-
gan pardoned a total of 393 individuals in eight years, compared to
the 534 pardoned by his predecessor in four, and commuted only
thirteen sentences. The percentage of Reagan's favorable actions
in pardon cases dipped to a low point for the century of twenty
percent, and his overall grant rate to thirteen percent. President
pursuant to such a master warrant, though commutations are generally evidenced by
separate warrants so that the prison warden can satisfy himself of the grant's
authenticity.
33. See WARRANTS OF PARDON, supra note 20. Until the Bush administration,
pardons were granted at periodic intervals throughout the year, with the exception of
the Nixon grants which came only at Christmas. President Bush issued very few
grants during his four years in office, but none at Christmas until the end of his term.
Most of President Clinton's pardons have been granted a day or two before
Christmas.
34. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY ACrIOINS
BY ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1996 (through Jan. 31, 1996) (Jan. 31, 1996); PRESIDEN-
TIAL CLEMENCY ACrIONS BY ADMINISTRATION AND RELIEF SOUGHT, 1969-1996
(through Jan. 31, 1996) (Jan. 31, 1996) [hereinafter, collectively, 1996 OPA CLEMENCY
ACTIONS]. Because statistics on the total number of clemency applications acted
upon were not compiled separately for pardons and commutations until 1967, it is
impossible to tell exactly what percentage of pardon petitions alone were granted
until the Nixon Administration. That said, Franklin Roosevelt granted 27.8% of all
clemency petitions acted upon during his tenure, Truman granted 41.5%, Eisenhower
granted 26.7%, and Kennedy granted 40.9%. (In light of the fact that Eisenhower
commuted only 47 sentences in eight years, it is likely that his 1110 pardons represent
more than 30% of the total number of pardon petitions acted on during his two
terms.) Nixon granted 51% of the pardon petitions acted on during his tenure, and
26.3% of pardon and commutation petitions combined; Ford granted 39% of pardon
petitions and 31.2% overall; and Carter granted 34% of pardon petitions and 21.6%
overall. See id.
35. See id. Often the commutation took the form of sentence modification to
make the petitioner eligible for parole, leaving the actual release decision up to the
Parole Commission. See, e.g., WARRANTS OF PARDON, supra note 20 (granting clem-
ency to Eileen Rock Lowe on October 27, 1983, for kidnapping, commuting the life
sentence to 21 years' imprisonment, "which will make her immediately eligible for
parole consideration"). Sometimes the sentence was reduced so as to make the recip-
ient eligible for mandatory release on parole, thereby ensuring his supervision for at
least some period of time after release.
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Bush granted even fewer pardons: his sixty-eight grants36 repre-
sented only seven percent of the pardon petitions acted on during
his four years in office. Factoring in his three commutations, his
overall grant rate is four percent. President Clinton's record at this
point in his presidency is about the same as that of President Bush:
during the seven years of his presidency, through the end of 1999,
he has pardoned 145 individuals, or about thirteen percent of those
whose pardon petitions were acted on during that period. 37 His
fifteen commutations38 and two fine remissions bring his overall
grant rate through the end of calendar 1999 to about 4.5%.
One might predict that the reduced likelihood of favorable ac-
tion on a clemency petition since the mid-1980s would be reflected
in a corresponding reduction in the number of annual clemency
filings. However, it appears that seekers after clemency remain
ever hopeful. Since the beginning of the Clinton administration the
rate of pardon filings has remained relatively steady at about 225
petitions each year, more than were filed annually during the Bush
administration and almost regaining the level of filings during Pres-
ident Reagan's second term.39 The number of commutation peti-
tions filed annually has increased dramatically during the Clinton
administration, up from about 150 each year during the Reagan
36. This figure does not count the six Iran-Contra grantees, who did not file appli-
cations with the Pardon Attorney and were pardoned by proclamation. See 1996
OPA CLEMENCY AcrnONS, supra note 34.
37. It is difficult to compare President Clinton's pardon grant rate with that of his
predecessors at this point in his term because of the large number of petitions filed
during his administration that have not yet been acted on. While in the recent past
the number of pardon cases carried over from year to year has tended to remain
relatively stable, since 1995 the number of pending pardon cases has grown each year
by about one hundred cases, so that 737 pardon cases awaited action in February,
2000. See OPA CLEMENCY ACrIONS, supra note 24.
38. Prior to the FALN commutations in 1999, President Clinton had granted only
three commutations: one in 1994 to Ernest Krikava, a Nebraska hog farmer sen-
tenced in 1993 to five months' imprisonment for perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding,
whose clemency petition had attracted intense media interest and support of family
farm groups; and two in 1995 to individuals convicted of drug trafficking offenses who
had cooperated with the government. One of these was made to Johnny Palacios,
sentenced in 1991 to 71 months' imprisonment for distribution of marijuana, whose
cooperation the court refused to recognize for jurisdictional reasons; and the other
was made to Jackie Trautman, sentenced in 1992 to 33 months' imprisonment (as re-
duced) for distribution of cocaine, whose cooperation had already earned her two
sentence reductions from the court on motion of the U.S. Attorney. See WARRANTS
OF PARDON, supra note 20.
39. See OPA CLEMENCY AcrIONS, supra note 24.
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and Bush administrations, to an average of 500 annually after
1992.40
B. Causes of Pardon's Decline
What lies behind the recent trend towards fewer pardons de-
scribed in the preceding section? As noted above, statistics on an-
nual clemency filings rule out a decline in demand, for there
appears to be no slackening of interest in obtaining either sentence
reduction or post-sentence relief. Indeed, there are few alternative
early release mechanisms available to most federal inmates,4' or
other means of relieving many of the civil disabilities resulting
from a conviction.42 Finally, the declining rate of pardoning is too
pronounced and too persistent to be the result of accident or coin-
cidence. So it is reasonable to conclude that the declining number
of clemency actions in recent years is the result of considered exec-
utive policy.
It has been suggested that pardon's modern "atrophy" is attribu-
table to changes in penal philosophy: initially, in the early part of
the twentieth century, "the rehabilitative ideal reduced the impor-
tance of pardons by giving their job to paroles and indeterminate
sentencing. '' 43 Later, in the 1970s, the "new retributivism" rejected
pardon as an unprincipled tampering with lawfully determined
40. Given the negligible number of commutations since 1980, it is fair to assume
that the increase in inmate petitions is attributable as much to the growth of the fed-
eral prison population and longer determinate sentences as to any realistic hope of
favorable action.
41. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for persons sentenced
after November 1, 1987, and provides only one avenue other than clemency by which
an inmate may gain release prior to expiration of sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (1987) (providing that inmates may seek early release from the
sentencing court, on motion of the Bureau of Prisons, "for extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons"). An analogous provision is available for inmates serving paroleable
sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (2000). The Bureau of Prisons uses these provi-
sions only in particularly extraordinary or compelling circumstances which could not
reasonably have been foreseen by the court at the time of sentencing, generally inter-
preted to mean when the inmate is terminally ill and close to death. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 571.60 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE SEN-
TENCING PROJECT (1998); OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
(1996); see also Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994) (holding that federal
felons may regain firearms privileges only through a federal restoration procedure,
which currently is limited to a presidential pardon).
43. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 83.
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penalties ("an unwelcome intrusion on an enlightened process"44 ).
However, while it is certainly correct that pardon has not played an
important role as a sentence reduction mechanism since the 1930s,
the pardon power thrived long afterwards in the federal system as a
means of relieving civil disabilities stemming from a conviction, of
recognizing and encouraging rehabilitation, and of signaling official
"forgiveness. '45  While retributivism may resist unprincipled ad-
justments to punishment, it cannot account for an unwillingness to
make merciful gestures that are largely symbolic. But now even
this "stripped down and hollowed out ' 46 form of clemency is
threatened with obsolescence, bespeaking an official unwillingness
to be merciful quite independent of a retributivist commitment to
just deserts and truth in sentencing.
It appears more likely that pardon's declining incidence since
1980 is attributable to the politics of crime control, a politics that
has produced some of the most potent and divisive electoral issues
of the last thirty years. Since the early 1980s, Republicans and
Democrats have competed for advantage in a "race to incarcer-
ate, 47 producing a "prison industrial complex" with a powerful in-
stitutional constituency.48 Politicians and bureaucrats alike have
been far more interested in feeding the front end of the justice sys-
tem through enacting more laws, hiring more prosecutors, and
building more prisons, than in helping people avoid becoming en-
meshed in the system in the first place, creating opportunities for
them to earn their way to freedom, or finding ways to encourage
44. Id. at 84; see also Rapaport, supra note 14, at 9 ("The neo-retributivist critique
of clemency reflects, reinforces and expands upon the impulse to improve if not per-
fect criminal justice by circumscribing discretion.").
45. See supra note 32.
46. MOORE, supra note 3, at 83.
47. Marc Mauer describes the interplay of crime and politics in the 1980s and
1990s. See MARC MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 56-
80 (1999); see also David Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719
(1999) (discussing the recent growth in U.S. prison populations). In 1997, former
President Jimmy Carter recalled that,
as a young Governor of Georgia, he and contemporaries like Reuben Askew
in Florida and Dale Bumpers in Arkansas had 'an intense competition' over
who had the smallest prison population. 'Now it's totally opposite, Mr.
Carter said. 'Now the governors brag on how many prisons they've built and
how many people they can keep in jail and for how long.
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, quoted in MAUER, supra, at 56.
48. Eric Schlosser describes this phenomenon as "a set of bureaucratic, political
and economic interests that encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regard-
less of the actual need." Eric Schlosser, The Prison Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 51, 54 (Dec. 1998).
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their reintegration into the community. It is hard to find a place
for pardon in a system with such priorities.
The process by which pardon came to be devalued in the federal
justice system was hastened by the Attorney General's decision in
the Reagan Administration to delegate authority to approve clem-
ency recommendations to the same subordinate official within the
Department of Justice who exercised day-to-day supervisory re-
sponsibility over federal prosecutions.4 9 This had important conse-
quences for the independence and integrity of the Department's
clemency program. Clemency recommendations prepared by the
Pardon Attorney no longer carried the symbolic and political
weight of the Attorney General's personal imprimatur, or reflected
the perspective of the Attorney General's dual role as chief law
enforcement officer and political adviser to the President. Rather,
they increasingly reflected the perspective of prosecutors, in policy
positions in Washington and in the field, who did not always have a
clear understanding of or appreciation for clemency. 0 In this envi
ronment, it did not take long for the Department's clemency pro-
49. See supra note 26. Since the late 1970s, the functions of reviewing the Depart-
ment's clemency recommendations and supervising federal prosecutions have been
performed by the same official, the Associate Attorney General for most of the 1980s
and the Deputy Attorney General since 1989. For most of this time that official has
either been a former prosecutor himself, or has had career prosecutors on his staff
review the clemency recommendations drafted by the Pardon Attorney. This has
tended to reinforce the traditional policy of giving substantial weight to the views of
the United States Attorney whose office prosecuted a clemency applicant in deciding
whether to recommend a case favorably. See, e.g., HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 123-28
n. 42 (citing Hearings on S.J. Res. 282, 67th Cong., Before the Joint Comm. on the
Reorganization of the Admin. Branch of Gov't, 68th Cong. 1 (1924) (statements of
Harry M. Daugherty and Rush L. Holland)); see also U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 1-
2.111 ("The views of the United States Attorney are given considerable weight in
determining what recommendations the Department should make to the President.").
50. See, e.g., Larry Margasak, Any Pardons Would Come After Election Day, Ob-
servers Say, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 18, 1988 ("the administration's use of career prosecu-
tors to screen pardon requests has 'resulted in a natural inclination for tighter
scrutiny"' (quoting Deputy Associate Attorney General William Landers)). It may
be presumed that the Department's pardon program suffered in the early years of the
Reagan administration because of the President's decision, only a few weeks after
taking office, to abort through a preemptive pardon the Justice Department's prose-
cution of two FBI officials convicted of authorizing illegal "black bag jobs," report-
edly without notifying the prosecutors or involving the Attorney General. See Pardon
for W. Mark Felt & Edward S. Miller, Statement of the President, 17 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 437 (Apr. 15, 1981) (generosity due "two men who acted on high principle
to bring an end to terrorism that was threatening our nation"); see also REPORT OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE, REC. Ass'N B. N.Y.C., The Felt-Miller Presidential
Pardon, Oct. 1981, at 411, 414. In 1983, the Office of the Pardon Attorney was relo-
cated from downtown Washington to Chevy Chase, Maryland.
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gram to become an extension of its "tough on crime" law
enforcement agenda.
Particularly during the latter part of the Bush administration, an
unofficial policy of parsimony in pardoning was firmly in place at
the Justice Department, as the war on crime went into high gear.
The Willie Horton episode was a lively reminder of the possibility
of embarrassment or worse if a recipient of clemency turned out to
be less than deserving. 51 During the first years of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, the determination of the White House not to cede
anything to the political opposition on crime issues virtually as-
sured prosecutors' continued influence over the pardon program in
the Department.5 Over time, standards for recommending a case
for pardon were set higher and the review process became more
rigorous, 53 resulting in a corresponding drop in the number of par-
don cases sent forward to the White House for favorable action.
As for commutation petitions, it was generally anticipated that
most would be summarily recommended for denial. In these cir-
cumstances, absent an independent interest at the White House in
the routine work of pardoning, it was inevitable that the number
and frequency of ordinary clemency grants would steadily decline.
51. See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA:
HOW THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995). Another
danger was that a particular grant might be distorted and give a mistaken impression
of the Administration's commitment to crime control. For example, after President
Bush pardoned a particularly deserving and well-known individual who had been con-
victed of a minor marijuana possession offense thirty years before, the grant was char-
acterized as "especially ironic, given the administration's current push to enact
tougher penalties on drug offenders .... " Tom Watson, In Rare Move, Bush Pardons
Drug Offender; Civic Service, Campaign Win Forgiveness for Harlem Globetrotter,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1; see also Pardon Me, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996
(quoting Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa,: "I don't know how you can champion yourself in
the debate on drug use when you pardon drug dealers.").
52. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., All the President's Pardons: The Real Scandal, NAT'L J.,
Oct. 30, 1999, at 3116. ("Clinton's neglect of his pardon power apparently derives
from the same determination to out-tough the Republicans on crime that explains his
support for draconian mandatory minimum prison sentences.").
53. See, e.g., Pete Earley, Presidents Set Own Rules on Granting Clemency, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 1984, at A17 (Pardon Attorney David Stephenson reports that his
office has become more "exacting" in its scrutiny of pardon applications, "to better
reflect the administration's philosophy toward crime."). Deputy Associate Attorney
General William Landers also states that
It's not enough that someone convicted does not commit another offense
and is gainfully employed .... There has to be extraordinary conduct after
conviction that shows they contributed to the community in a unique or sig-
nificant fashion, such as charitable contributions or community volunteer
work - something that shows they have gone the extra mile over what an
ordinary citizen may do.
Margasak, supra note 50.
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Based on the number of pardons granted by President Clinton in
the first six years of his tenure, one might predict that his overall
pardoning record would be about the same as President Bush's.
However, there have recently been some hopeful signs that he is
interested in exploring both the justice-dispensing and symbolic as-
pects of clemency. Perhaps most significantly, President Clinton
justified his 1999 FALN grants in retributivist terms by reference to
the disproportionate prison terms involved. 4 In addition, he is-
sued three pardons in 1999 and early 2000 whose evident purpose
was to correct a miscarriage of justice. One of these was an unprec-
edented posthumous grant to Henry Flipper, the first African-
American graduate of West Point, whose 1881 court martial had
long been officially acknowledged as unwarranted and unfair.
54. See FALN Letter, supra note 5, at 2 ("[T]he prisoners were serving extremely
lengthy sentences - in some cases 90 years - which were out of proportion to their
crimes."); see also id. at 3 ("For me, the question . . . was whether the prisoners'
sentences were unduly severe and whether their continuing incarceration served any
meaningful purpose."). This letter also made reference to the "worldwide support"
for clemency in the cases on "humanitarian grounds." Id. at 2 (quoting letters from
President Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Coretta Scott King). Presi-
dent Carter reportedly had written that each individual recipient of clemency had
"spent many years in prison, and no legitimate deterrent or correctional purpose is
served by continuing their incarceration." Id. Bishop Tutu and Mrs. King were said
to have sought clemency because the prisoners "have spent over a decade in prison,
while their children have grown up without them." Id. Cognizant of the political
furor stirred up by the grants, President Clinton emphasized that "political considera-
tions played no role" in his decision or in the decision-making process. Id. at 4. Doc-
uments subsequently released to the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that law
enforcement agencies had opposed clemency, and that the Department of Justice had
at least initially recommended against it. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee Concerning Clemency for FALN Members, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 1999
WL 27595875 (Oct. 20, 1999) (statement of Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen.). As
noted previously, the clemency decision proved extremely controversial, and its mer-
its were debated in the press for a number of weeks. See, e.g., Editorial, Puerto Rican
Clemency, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1999, at A36 ("It was perhaps inevitable that Mr.
Clinton's action should be assessed through the prism of New York politics, but it is
also unfortunate. Whatever the President's motives, the case for clemency is
strong.").
55. See Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon
of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251 (1999). The Flipper grant was
unprecedented because it had long been the Pardon Attorney's policy not to accept or
process posthumous pardon applications, in reliance on Supreme Court precedent
analogizing a pardon to a "deed" that must be accepted. However, Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder is reported to have explained that "[t]he Justice Department's
recommendation was up to him ... and he favored it." Elizabeth Amon, The Pro
Bono Pardon: How Arnold and Porter Cleared a Man's Name a Century Later, NAT'L
L. J., June 28, 1999, at Al, col. 2. In their brief in support of the pardon application,
lawyers for the Flipper family noted that the stigma of Lt. Flipper's conviction had
discouraged inclusion of his statute in a "Walk of History" under consideration by the
City of El Paso. Jackson et al., supra, at 1264. They urged that pardon be granted to
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Another was a grant to Freddie Meeks, one of two surviving mem-
bers of a crew of African-American sailors convicted of mutiny in
connection with a racially charged incident at the Port Chicago Na-
val Magazine during World War 11.56 The third significant pardon,
also in a case with racial overtones, was granted to Preston King,
an African-American who had lived in self-imposed exile for al-
most four decades after his 1961 conviction in Georgia for draft
evasion.57
The FALN grants recognize the hardships imposed by prison
sentences whose length is disproportionate to the crime, while the
three pardons recognize the hardships imposed by the lingering
legal disabilities and stigma of a criminal conviction. Perhaps the
spirit of humanity and reconciliation that motivated these well-re-
remove "the unjust blot upon his outstanding reputation and character," for "Lieu-
tenant Flipper and his descendants, for the good of the military justice system, and for
the good of our country.. ." Id. at 1291. At the White House ceremony at which the
pardon was granted, President Clinton stated that "This good man has now com-
pletely recovered his good name." Id. at 1254. Deputy Attorney General Holder
stated in a subsequent interview that "'This has resonance beyond this case, beyond
Lt. Flipper . . . . What happened to him was really troubling - it was racism."'
Amon, supra, at A14.
56. While the pardon warrant in the Meeks case does not explicitly refer to the
reason for clemency, it is significant that his case was singled out from other pardons
granted on the same day for special treatment in a separate and unusually detailed
warrant. See Executive Grant of Clemency to Freddie Meeks (Dec. 23, 1999). Press
accounts of the pardon reported that "a legal review of the case by the Navy in 1994
found that the black sailors were the victims of racial prejudice," and that
"[1]awmakers, veterans' groups and the NAACP had urged Clinton to grant the par-
don." Associated Press, President Pardons Veteran Convicted in 1944 Mutiny, WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 1999, at A4. See also Editorial, The President's Pardons, WASH. POST,
Dec. 27, 1999 ("the pardon is recognition that the conviction was a terrible injustice").
One of the effects of the pardon was to restore Meeks' military benefits. See Associ-
ated Press, President Pardons Veteran, supra.
57. According to press accounts, King refused to report for induction after his all-
white draft board in Georgia refused to renew his student deferment, on grounds that
the board had treated him in a racially discriminatory fashion. He was sentenced in
1961 to 18 months in prison on a conviction for draft evasion, but fled the country
while on bail and returned to England where he had been pursing graduate studies at
the London School of Economics. At the time of his pardon he was a professor of
political theory at the University of Lancaster and father of a British Member of Par-
liament. In support of pardon, the sentencing judged acknowledged that King had
been subjected to a "long-lasting, deeply rooted method of racial discrimination," and
that he had "followed his conscience just as Rosa Parks had followed hers." Philip
Shenon, Pardon Lets Black Exile Come Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A12;
Reuters, Black Professor Pardoned in 1961 Draft Board Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2000, at A2. King's application for pardon was supported by the NAACP and several
human rights groups. The White House noted that the clemency process had been
expedited to permit Dr. King to return to the United States for his brother's funeral,
out of "humanitarian concerns." Id.
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ceived pardon grants, coupled with optimism over the "lowest
crime rate in thirty years, 58 will inspire the President to look care-
fully at some of the less visible cases that have historically consti-
tuted the vast majority of clemency applicants.
C. The President's Duty to Pardon
1. Pardon as Public Mercy
The fact that there have been so comparatively few pardons
since 1980 invites speculation about whether the President might
decide to stop pardoning entirely, simply letting the power lapse.
This in turn raises the questions whether the President has any duty
to pardon, and what the source of such a duty might be. Judicial
precedent is not very helpful in providing answers to these ques-
tions: on the one hand, the courts describe pardon as a "part of the
Constitutional scheme" to be exercised for the "public welfare; 59
on the other, they call it "a matter of grace" that need not be justi-
fied or defended within the legal system.60 While pardon's "pub-
lic welfare" aspect might support an argument that the President
has some obligation to "afford relief from undue harshness or
evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal
law,"' 6' its "grace" aspect points the other way, indicating that
an individual is not entitled to a pardon in the same sense that
he is entitled to receive a just punishment. Therefore, while the
President may not be entirely free of constitutional constraints
58. Marc Lacey, Clinton Isn't Running for Office, But He Has a Lot to Say About
the Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A18 (quoting the President at his news confer-
ence on February 16, 2000).
59. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) ("A pardon in our day is not a
private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the
Constitutional scheme. When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate author-
ity that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judg-
ment fixed." (citing In re Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120, 121 (1925))). In Perovich, the
Court upheld the President's authority to commute the death sentence of a convicted
murderer, over the objections of the purported beneficiary of the grant: "Just as thp
original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and
in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, and not his
consent determines what shall be done." Perovich, 274 U.S. at 485.
60. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 282, 285 (1998).
Where the federal pardon power is concerned, the courts have consistently declined
to limit its exercise; see, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264-66 (1974) (upholding
President's right to commute a death sentence conditional upon service of life without
parole); cf. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1915) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may not be overcome by device of
preemptive pardon).
61. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120-21.
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in his exercise of the power,62 it seems clear that he cannot be
legally compelled to grant a pardon even in case of "evident mis-
take. "63
Nor would one expect to find much support for a duty to pardon
in prevailing theories of punishment, which presume that the law
reflects society's judgment about each person's "just deserts." In-
deed, the conventional retributivist view of pardon is as something
akin to a gift, and thus inconsistent with justice.64 Recently, how-
ever, concern over statutory limitations on flexibility and discretion
in sentencing has given rise to new interest in pardon as a neces-
sary (though extraordinary) means of adjusting an imperfect legal
system. In her influential 1989 monograph, Kathleen Dean Moore
looks to pardon to compensate for the absence of a mechanism in
the law whereby punishments can be individualized.65 She posits a
distinction between legal liability and moral desert, urging that
punishments be at least partially uncoupled from a legal frame-
work and tested against a set of retributivist categories such as in-
nocence and excuse. In this fashion, she argues, pardon can be
applied systematically to make exceptions to the rules "when the
62. The Supreme Court has recently indicated that the Due Process Clause applies
to the clemency process, although the level of protection it provides may be minimal.
See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 282-85. In Woodard, the justices split 5-4 on the issue
whether a clemency applicant is constitutionally entitled to due process, with the mi-
nority taking the position that clemency is "a matter of grace" entirely outside of the
judicial process. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 282, 285. Of the five who thought some pro-
cess was due, four thought it minimal: the governor could not "flip[ ] a coin," or
"arbitrarily den[y] a prisoner any access to its clemency process." Id. at 289
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, took the position that Ohio's creation of mandatory clemency application and
review procedures made it part of the adjudicative process and thus fully amenable to
judicial oversight. See id. at 292-93 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Court did not decide the question whether clemency proceedings might be
subject to the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 276. Justice Stevens noted, how-
ever, that "no one would contend that a governor could . . . use race, religion, or
political affiliation as a standard for granting or denying clemency." Id. at 292 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. This is not to say that the President may not have a legally enforceable duty to
consider granting clemency. It is simply to say that his decision on the merits is not
subject to judicial review, except perhaps on Equal Protection grounds. See id.
64. Jeffrie Murphy notes Immanuel Kant's view that "[tlhe right to pardon a crim-
inal, either by mitigating or by entirely remitting the punishment, is certainly the most
slippery of all the rights of the sovereign. By exercising it he can demonstrate the
splendor of his majesty and yet thereby wreak injustice to a high degree." IMMANUEL
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 107-08 (J. Ladd trans., 1965), quoted in
Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 174 n.9 (1988).
65. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 128-29.
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general presumptions are defeated by exceptional circumstan-
ces."
66
Consistent with her retributivist model, however, Moore concep-
tualizes pardon as "an act of justice rather than an act of mercy. 67
If a just system is obligated to punish each person the same as
others similarly situated, and pardon is a way of assuring that each
person receives the punishment he deserves, then each morally de-
serving person who has not received a just punishment deserves a
pardon. And, if a person deserves a pardon in this sense, then
there is a corresponding duty to give him one. Thus, she argues,
"pardons are not discretionary. ' 68 It follows that, as a matter of
fairness, a pardon would have to be given to all similarly situated
and presumably equally deserving individuals. In effect, Moore
would have pardon function as an adjunct of the legal system, if not
to replicate it at least continually to correct its outcomes.
Moore's effort to justify clemency on retributivist grounds neces-
sarily devalues its historical association with compassion and re-
demption, making it substantively indistinguishable from justice.
This in turn has procedural implications that would convert clem-
ency proceedings into "judicial courts of last resort. '69 If pardon is
a nondiscretionary duty of justice, its administration necessarily re-
quires the establishment of a full-blown executive apparatus for
making judgments about "just deserts" in individual cases that par-
allels the judicial system, and that is grounded in clearly articulated
standards and supported by procedural protections, such as the giv-
ing of reasons and the right to appeal.70 At the very least, such a
66. Id.
67. Id. at 129. See also id. at 213 ("a justified pardon is one that corrects injustice
rather than tempers justice with mercy").
68. Id. at 214.
69. Rapaport, supra note 14, at 21. Professor Rapaport disagrees with Moore's
reduction of clemency "to a type of remedial justice," and urges a greater use of "dis-
cretionary lenity" in accordance with justice-based norms as well as "the storehouse
of traditional nonretributivist justifications for clemency," like post-conviction reha-
bilitation and heroism. Id. at 19, 27-30. See also Michael A. G. Korengold et al., And
Justice for Few: The Collapse of the Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20
HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 366 (1996) ("clemency is necessarily and properly separate
from the judicial system" and "may be granted on different factors than those consid-
ered in appellate review").
70. Daniel Kobil develops the administrative implications of Professor Moore's
theory of clemency-as-justice by proposing to place clemency's "justice-enhancing"
functions in "a professional board that is independent of the political pressures which
inevitably distort the decisions of elected officials." Kobil, supra note 3, at 622. In
making decisions about the mitigation of punishment, his "clemency commission"
would be guided by "explicit, internally consistent standards," and operate pursuant
to a full panoply of due process protections, including the giving of reasons and an
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duplicative system would be highly inefficient, unless pardon were
somehow co-opted into functioning as part of the legal system, as it
does in the military and in some states.71 Of greater concern, this
"bureaucratization of the clemency power" 72 would sacrifice ex-
actly those qualities that commended pardon to the framers: quick
action, broad discretion, and personal accountability to the
electorate.73
A sounder philosophical justification for pardon, one that pro-
vides support for Moore's notion of executive duty without major
revisions in pardon's historical character, has been suggested by
Jeffrie Murphy. Murphy grounds pardon squarely and exclusively
in the concept of mercy, which in his view is an "autonomous moral
virtue" entirely separate from justice.74 A private individual shows
mercy when she voluntarily, out of compassion, waives a right to
impose a penalty, a right that could in justice be claimed. Extrapo-
lating from this private law paradigm, Murphy finds a justification
for pardon as a collective exercise of mercy by the community as a
whole, through its chief executive:
If each citizen can justly exercise mercy individually when his
individual interests are at issue, why may not all citizens justly
join together and exercise mercy collectively when their collec-
tive interests are at issue? And if they may do this by statute,
may they not call on the governor to pardon? And if they may
opportunity to be heard, similar to those applicable in "the analogous release proce-
dure of the parole process." Id. at 624, 634. In this fashion "[tihe extrajudicial correc-
tive of clemency provides a safety valve for our criminal justice system, another
opportunity for an offender to tell her story more thoroughly, or at least differently,
than she could at trial." Id. at 613.
71. See Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive
Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413 (1999); THE NAT'L GOVERNORS' Ass'N
CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERI-
CAN STATES (1988) [hereinafter GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY]. In Georgia, for
example, an inmate who is not eligible for parole may seek administrative early re-
lease by pardon from the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. See id., at 59-61.
72. Rapaport, supra note 14, at 37.
73. See supra notes 11-13.
74. See HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 175; see also Jean Hampton, The
Retributive Idea, in HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 158-59 ("mercy is the
suspension or mitigation of a punishment that would otherwise be deserved as retri-
bution, and which is granted out of pity for the wrongdoer"); cf. Carla A.H. Johnson,
Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 LAW & PHIL. 109, 116-17 (1991)
("to eliminate the concept of legal mercy ... because it is in most cases a means of
doing justice is to ignore the message of history .... It is precisely because the law
defines justice narrowly, limiting power before the law to the institutional power of
entitlements and rights, that it can require genuine mercy to achieve genuine
justice.").
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call on the governor to pardon in a particular case, may they not
simply delegate to the governor ... the power to exercise mercy
on their behalf whenever he believes that they would, out of
love and compassion, so desire - even if they have not peti-
tioned and even if they are not unanimous on the issue?75
Murphy does not suggest that an individual is entitled to mercy, or
that an official with power to show mercy may be under any obliga-
tion to do so. To the contrary, he is careful to distinguish between
the discretionary decision to pardon that is reposed in a head of
state, usually by some organic document, from the nondiscretion-
ary legal duty of justice owed by a prosecutor, judge, or parole
board.76
By conceptualizing mercy as separate from, rather than a subset
of justice, Murphy avoids most issues of individual entitlement.
Yet his mercy is not a "free gift or act of grace."77 He argues that
mercy "must not be arbitrary or capricious but must rather rest
upon some good reason - some morally relevant feature of the
situation that made the mercy seem appropriate."'78 Where public
mercy or pardon is concerned, "good reason" may be determined
not simply by reference to what an individual morally deserves, but
also by what serves the public welfare:
The "job description" [of a chief executive] may ... involve a
concern for the common good or common welfare of the com-
munity in the executive's care. This might mean that, in deciding
whether to pardon an individual, the chief executive (unlike a
trial judge) might legitimately draw upon values other than the
requirements of justice and thus might legitimately ignore the
just deserts of an individual and pardon that individual if the
good of the community required it.79
75. HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 177-78 (emphasis in original).
76. See id. at 173-74 ("Judges in criminal cases are obligated to do justice. So too,
I would argue, are prosecutors and parole boards in their exercise of discretion. Thus
there is simply no room for mercy as an autonomous virtue with which their justice
should be tempered."); see also id. at n.8 ("The focus of a judge, either in enforcing a
rule or in seeking a way to modify or get around it, is to be on the question of what is
required by justice - not on what he may be prompted out of compassion to do.").
Murphy's rejection of mercy in what he describes as the "criminal law paradigm" has
sometimes been misunderstood as a rejection of mercy itself. See Joan H. Krause,
Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women
Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 748-49 (1994); Rapaport, supra note 14, at 20.
77. See HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 180.
78. Id. at 181.
79. Id. at 174 n.9.
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In short, in making pardon decisions the chief executive may look
to "the requirements of justice," but he may also ignore those re-
quirements and grant a pardon for "the good of the community."
Moreover, Murphy argues that mercy is not constrained by prin-
ciples of fairness in the same way that justice is, because it is en-
tirely voluntary and, in the case of public mercy, because it has a
political dimension. For example, mercy "is more likely to be
needed by the poor and weak than by the rich and powerful."80
There is also a pragmatic reason why mercy is not constrained by a
conventional obligation to be even-handed: "[I]f rational persons
thought that once having shown mercy they would be stuck with
making a regular practice of it, they might be inclined never to
show it at all." 81
Murphy does not elaborate on what standards ought to guide the
exercise of the pardon power within the general parameters of mo-
rality and the common good. It is reasonable to suppose that, with
one caveat, he would consider them best left to the discretion of
the executive who has been popularly chosen to be the "dispenser
of the mercy of the government."82 The caveat is that it would be
inappropriate and perhaps an abuse of power to withhold mercy in
a case where moral desert had been established (proof of inno-
cence comes to mind as an obvious example), whatever public sen-
timent might be. On the other hand, a gesture of mercy could be
appropriate simply because it would be popular, thus satisfying a
felt need in the community to alleviate a legally determined pun-
ishment in a particular case, or across the board.
To summarize, Murphy sees pardon as a manifestation of public
mercy that has a legitimate role in a retributivist legal system, to
override the law where its outcome is unjust or where the common
welfare otherwise requires it. Thus Murphy might elaborate on
Hamilton to advise the President that he is empowered to make
"exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt," but ordinarily is not
obliged to - except in cases where a compelling moral claim has
been established. He might also suggest that pardon decisions will
ordinarily be guided by considerations of moral relevance, but
80. Id. at 182.
81. Id. at 183.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 8, at 423. One might predict a certain
amount of discomfort with this idea in an age where we tend to distrust both discre-
tionary decision-making and our elected leaders. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 3, at 614
("Unfortunately, both justice-enhancing and justice-neutral aspects of clemency suffer
when the executive has recourse only to her own moral and political sensibilities in
making clemency decisions.").
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need not be if the welfare of the community provides an alternative
justification. Finally, he might tell the President that he ordinarily
has no duty to treat like cases alike.83
2. The Political Duty to Pardon
In Murphy's theory of public mercy, there is generally no incon-
sistency between pardon as an uncompelled "matter of grace,"'
and pardon as an authoritative act that is "part of the constitutional
scheme." This theory thus reconciles seemingly contradictory
Supreme Court precedent and provides a coherent framework for
analyzing particular exercises of the pardon power. It also pro-
vides the basis for an argument that the President has a duty to
pardon, not just where moral desert has been established in a par-
ticular case, but also as a more general obligation of office. This
latter aspect of the duty to pardon is neither grounded in nor lim-
ited by considerations of law or morality, but is essentially one of
politics.
The political duty to be merciful "if the good of the community
require[s] it" may be inferred from the several ways in which par-
don helps the President carry out his other constitutional duties.
First, pardon serves the purpose of checking the legislature when
the criminal law is static and inflexible, by signaling the need for
changes in the law itself.8 5 Thus, for example, the President's deci-
83. While there is no duty to pardon all similarly situated offenders, absent simi-
larly compelling moral claims, the pardon power may not be exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Murphy seems to equate an "act of grace" and a "free gift," see Murphy, supra
note 64, at 180, but I would argue that they should be conceptually distinguished, at
least insofar as pardon is concerned. Pardon may be an "act of grace" in the eyes of
the law, but it is not a "free gift" as a political matter because it is subject to standards
of moral relevance and the public welfare.
85. See SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 1, at 295-96:
[Pardon] has been the tool by which many of the most important reforms in
the substantive criminal law have been introduced. Ancient law was much
more static and rigid than our own. As human judgment came to feel that a,
given legal rule, subjecting a person to punishment under certain circum-
stances, was unjust, almost the only available way to avoid this rule was by
pardon... Quickly pardons on such grounds became a matter of course; and
from there to the recognition of such circumstances as a defense was only a
short step. This is what happened with self-defense, insanity, and infancy, to
mention only three examples.
Id. This law reform function is consistent with the retributivist theory that the need
for pardon provides a rough assessment of the moral legitimacy of the law. See
MOORE, supra note 3, at 129 ("If pardons grew to an unmanageable number, one
would have to be suspicious that the legal codes were seriously out of kilter with the
moral code."); Rapaport, supra note 14, at 39-40 (while clemency is "ill-suited as a
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sion to commute a sentence mandated by the terms of a statute,
based on his conclusion that the punishment was disproportion-
ately harsh in light of all the circumstances (including some that the
law could not take into account), might encourage legislative in-
quiry into the possible need for changes in the law to allow individ-
ual circumstance to be considered.86 A grant of clemency might
also reveal shortcomings in the appeals process that limit a court's
ability to consider new evidence or changed circumstance. But, be-
cause pardon is a political duty and not a duty of justice, the Presi-
dent would be under no obligation to grant clemency to all
offenders with arguably similar equitable claims.
Pardon also serves as an executive check on courts' discretionary
decisions.87 While much of the current interest in federal clemency
arises precisely from the limits on judicial discretion imposed by
the federal sentencing guidelines and statutory mandatory mini-
mum sentences, it is possible that an act of executive mercy might
lead a court to rethink its own discretionary powers and interpret
them more broadly.
Within the executive branch, pardon can play an important role
in carrying out the President's obligation to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed in two ways. First, it enables the President
to intercede directly to change the outcome of a case that he be-
lieves was wrongly handled by his subordinates, where no judicial
remedy is available.88 Second, it permits him to send a very direct
and powerful message to his subordinates about how he wishes the
means to overcome wholesale legislative failures," it "may play a role in reopening
channels of politics to systemic reform").
86. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 76, at 719-42 (discussing relationship between gu-
bernatorial clemency actions and legislatively authorized reviews and releases for bat-
tered women unable to offer battering defenses at the time of their trials).
87. See In re Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925) (justifying pardon on grounds,
among others, that "[tlhe administration of justice by the courts is not always wise or
certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt."). The par-
don power also came into play as a check on the power of the court-appointed In-
dependent Counsel in the Iran-Contra cases. See supra note 20.
88. See Thomas E. Sharp, The President's Policy Pardon: A Misunderstood Tool
of Presidential Decision-Making 26-33 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Sharp argues that the pardon power gives the President an ability to control
discretionary decisions of prosecutors that become legally irreversible before he is
aware of them. See id. at 30 (citing Attorney General William Randolph, Am. State
Papers, Misc. I, 46, No. 26 (1791)) ("[I]t may frequently arise that the United States
may be deeply affected by various proceedings in the inferior courts, which no appeal
can rectify."); see also Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforce-
ment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286-87 (1989). The inherent difficulty of supervising the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion has become a matter of greater concern because
of the number of federal prosecutions that result in guilty pleas, and the dislocations
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law to be enforced in the future, including in particular the manner
in which they should exercise their discretion.
Finally, the President's personal intervention in a case through
the pardon power reassures the public that the legal system is capa-
ble of just and moral application. It enables him to correct legal
errors that for one reason or another could not be corrected by the
courts, and to make equitable accommodation where a sentence
has been imposed according to the strict requirements of the law
but nonetheless seems unfair.89 It is especially important that the
public be confident in clemency as the "fail safe" of the justice sys-
tem in capital cases, which are now moving forward through the
federal system for the first time in many years.' At the other end
of the clemency spectrum, the President can use the opportunity
provided by post-sentence pardons to emphasize the rehabilitative
goals of the justice system by recognizing criminal justice success
stories.
The President's duty to pardon does not arise from any single
one of these "public welfare" grounds for pardon, but from a com-
bination of them all. And it is a duty that resists quantification, or
enforcement in any court other than that of public opinion. The
point is simply that if the President neglects the pardon power,
public confidence in it may be so undermined as to make it con-
structively unavailable to serve the benign purposes the framers
envisioned for it. In this way, failure to exercise the power may
have the same consequence as abusive exercise. Conversely, a gen-
erous and regular exercise of the power in circumstances evidently
warranting it, provides the President with an unparalleled opportu-
nity not simply to do justice in particular cases, but also to set an
in discretionary decision-making that have been produced by the federal sentencing
guidelines. See K. ST'ITH & J. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 130-42 (1998).
89. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 1, at 299 (enumerating situa-
tions in which clemency in the form of commutation may be appropriate, including
those involving "calm second judgment after a period of war hysteria, during which
persons were given very severe sentences for political offenses later realized to have
been very minor; "changed public opinion after a period of severe penalties against
certain conduct which is later looked upon as much less criminal, or as no crime at
all," citing prohibition as an example; and "[tiechnical violations leading to hard
results").
90. See Naftali Bendavid, Clinton Won't Follow Illinois on Executions, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 17, 2000, at 1; see also Excerpts from Clinton's Comments at Wide-Ranging News
Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A19 ("We are ... in the process of develop-
ing guidelines for clemency applications [in capital cases] where any individual claims
of innocence or question [about] the sentence, even though guilt is not a question, can
be pressed.").
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example for his appointees in the executive branch, for the other
branches of government, and for the public.
D. Reviving the Power
In this final section I propose a number of simple ways in which
the President can make his exercise of the pardon power more reli-
able and respectable, and therefore less politically risky. I do not
recommend that he attempt to insulate himself from public criti-
cism by establishing advisory boards and elaborate administrative
structures, since these tend to defeat the very virtues of the power
that the framers most valued: efficiency, discretion, and accounta-
bility.91 Nor do I think he should necessarily feel constrained to
explain himself or be consistent, which would be required of a deci-
sion-maker within a legal system, for the same reasons. 92 But there
are other ways he can reassure the public that the power is being
used wisely and for the general welfare.
1. Shore up the Attorney General's Advisory Role
Historically, the President has relied on the Attorney General
for advice in pardon cases, and this has afforded him the combined
91. See SANFORD, supra note 14 (discussing the "lonely" situation of the par-
doner); see also EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A
GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row 163 (1989) ("It was an awesome, ultimate
power over the lives of others that no person or government should have, or crave.").
Professor Rapaport observes that:
most state executives and the national executive are cautious compared to
their predecessors earlier in the century . . . . From the beginning of the
century through the 1960s, a rhetoric of claiming responsibility for the final
decision to execute or commute, to confine or release, came naturally to
governors. The governor of today is more likely to portray himself as bound
to respect the decision of a jury, the due process of trial and appellate courts,
and to heed obdurate victims.
Rapaport, supra note 14, at 5-6.
92. Professor Rapaport makes a compelling argument for a requirement that the
chief executive explain the reasons for each grant and denial of clemency: "Discre-
tion can give a better or worse account of itself; the body of cases and reasons ought
to exercise significant control over future practice. Such a record provides a basis for
criticism and even political repudiation of an executive." Rapaport, supra note 14, at
41. I do not disagree that full disclosure is often indispensable to full accountability.
Nor do I disagree that the executive should consider whether giving reasons for an act
of clemency will enhance the beneficial effects of the grant. But I am concerned that
there are also disadvantages of requiring the executive to give reasons in every case
that may outweigh the advantages, in constraining what Professor Rapaport calls "un-
ruly discretion" and ultimately discouraging its exercise. See also Wrong Way on Par-
dons, supra note 7 ("A bill that would diminish executive branch confidentiality
within the pardon process will only make presidents more wary of stepping into the
minefield that executive clemency has become.").
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perspective of law enforcement official and political adviser. The
President's acquiescence twenty years ago in the delegation of the
Attorney General's clemency-related responsibilities within the
Department of Justice meant that the advice he received was less
likely to reflect the views of a member of his Cabinet and more
likely to reflect those of prosecutors and other law enforcement
officials. It also left him without a high-level political appointee to
take some responsibility if a particular grant turned out to be ill-
advised or politically unpopular.
The Clinton administration also created substantive problems for
itself by undercutting the Justice Department's historically central
role in the clemency process.93 If the Attorney General is only one
of several possible sources of advice in clemency matters, and the
process is no longer a regular one, questions inevitably arise about
the relative importance of justice and politics in clemency decision-
making, and thus about the accessibility of official mercy to ordi-
nary people.
2. Be Generous and Expect No Credit
Generosity in extending mercy beyond the strict framework of
the law has been called "an important attitude of a healthy soci-
ety."' 94 Purely as a practical matter, a policy of generosity is likely
to be more effective than a policy of caution in avoiding unwar-
ranted criticism of particular grants. Until quite recently presidents
have been shielded from public criticism in connection with par-
doning by the frequency and regularity with which they acted on
pardon applications, as well as the sheer volume of their grants.
When the President signed a pardon warrant every couple of
months, granting relief to dozens of unknown "little people" sim-
ply because they had been recommended by the Attorney General,
he could credibly distance himself from the merits of any particular
93. See FALN Letter, supra note 5, at 4 (President's decision based on an in-
dependent investigation and recommendation of his White House Counsel). In rou-
tine responses to inquiries about the clemency process, the White House has stated
that it relies on advice from many quarters, including the Department of Justice, in
deciding whether to grant clemency. As a result of congressional concern over the
FALN grants, legislation was introduced to require the Justice Department to consult
with victims of crime and law enforcement agencies in connection with making a
clemency recommendation to the President. See § 2042, The Pardon Attorney Re-
form and Integrity Act, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 146 Cong. Rec. S538-05, 2000 WL
142206 (Feb. 9, 2000). The editors of the Washington Post opined that this bill might
encourage the President "to circumvent the Justice Department entirely." See Wrong
Way on Pardons, supra note 7.
94. SANFORD, supra note 14.
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case. But so few people have been pardoned in the past twenty
years that each new clemency action is regarded with suspicion and
subjected to intense scrutiny, no matter how apparently innocuous.
In any event, pubic criticism goes with the territory, as President
Clinton recognized in defending his FALN grants.95 It is never
possible to be absolutely certain about the wisdom of a particular
grant or the virtue of particular grantees, particularly given the de-
fining characteristic they share, but it is part of the President's job
to take risks in this regard. This means that he should decide cases
at a time when he can be held properly accountable for his actions,
and not at the very end of his term.96
3. Act First, Explain Later
Presidents have in the past acted on clemency cases without first
vetting them publicly, a practice which recent experience has
shown tends to bring the progress of a clemency case to a stand-
still.97 Where the White House calls attention to a clemency action
before it actually occurs or before it becomes final, a host of ques-
95. See FALN Letter, supra note 5, at 4.
Grants of clemency generate passionate views. In vesting the pardon power
in the President alone, the framers of our Constitution ensured that clem-
ency could be given even in cases that might be unpopular and controversial.
The history of our country is full of examples of clemency with which many
disagreed, sometimes fervently.
Id.
96. It is perhaps inevitable that a chief executive will be tempted to make pardon
grants just prior to leaving office, but it is equally inevitable that giving in to this
temptation tends to bring the power into disrepute. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 76,
at 721-25 (describing the furor resulting from the last-minute clemency actions of
Ohio Governor Celeste, which led to a 1995 amendment of the state constitution to
make the governor's clemency power subject to regulation). It is also true that there
have apparently been few instances of actual corruption in connection with the power.
See Rapaport, supra note 14, at 10 (noting that there were only two documented par-
don-selling scandals in the 20th century - one resulting in the 1920 impeachment of
Oklahoma Governor Walton, and the other resulting in the 1980 indictments of sev-
eral members of the administration of Tennessee Governor Blanton).
97. An example is the extensive media coverage during President Clinton's first
consideration of Jonathan Pollard's clemency petition. The Administration's appar-
ent attempt to take the public's pulse on the case back-fired when law enforcement
and intelligence agencies opposed to clemency took their own case to the media. See,
e.g., Michael Isikoff & Ruth Marcus, Justice's No. 2 Official May Propose Leniency for
Pollard, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1993, at A10; Barton Gellman, Aspin's Allegation
About Pollard Affects Clemency Campaign, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1993, at A6. In the
end the public opposition of senior administration officials, as well as the almost uni-
formly adverse reaction from the media, virtually foreclosed the President's ability to
act favorably, had he wished to do so. While clemency applicants and their supporters
often take their case to the media, problems of a different order are created when the
executive itself "goes public" prior to a grant. See also Krause, supra note 76, at 725
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tions arise that require prompt and thorough response lest the
power itself be compromised in the public eye. These questions are
much easier to answer after the fact. While the framers fully antici-
pated that clemency decisions would take into account popular
opinion, they would not likely have favored plebiscites even in this
context.
4. Make Considered Use of the Power in Light of Its
Public Purposes
The pardon power provides the President with an unparalleled
bully pulpit from which to speak about criminal law issues, large
and small, in the context of a specific fact situation. Issues that
come to mind include the harsh inflexibility of the drug sentencing
laws, the mandatory deportation of aliens convicted of minor and
sometimes dated offenses, the mitigating impact of domestic vio-
lence, and legislative curtailment of post-conviction judicial reme-
dies. But there are other less ambitious things that the pardon
power can accomplish, like recognizing and rewarding rehabilita-
tion, enabling individuals who have served enough time in prison
to return to their communities to make a new start (or, in case of
grave illness, to die at home with their families), or simply satisfy-
ing an individual's desire for an official gesture of forgiveness. It is,
in short, an effective way to shape criminal justice policy and tell
good news about the justice system at the same time.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that pardon will ever fade away entirely, even if the
criminal justice system could be made to work perfectly. Unlike
collar buttons, pardon will always be useful from a political stand-
point. But its current underutilization is disturbing, in light of the
mounting evidence that the justice system is not working perfectly,
or even close to it. The underutilization of pardon is disturbing
not so much because of its impact on disappointed individuals, but
because of what it reflects about the justice system and the message
it sends to those who administer it, as well as to the public. A
President's pardons say a lot about his priorities and overall goals
for the administration of justice. If rehabilitation and reconcilia-
tion are aspirations of government, pardon serves an important
symbolic purpose in marking a successful law enforcement effort.
(publicity surrounding Maryland Governor Schaefer's consideration of clemency for
battered women "almost stopped the 'mass' clemency in its tracks.").
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If, however, punishment is the primary objective, then it is unnec-
essary to be concerned about mercy or redemption, much less to
make a point of crediting them.98
The Constitution gives the President the power to pardon not as
a personal privilege but as an obligation of office. If he is willing
and able to use the power in the fashion envisioned by the framers,
courageously and creatively, he gains important opportunities to
signal the need for changes in the law, to set an example for discre-
tionary decision-making by his subordinates, and to shore up pub-
lic confidence in the overall morality of the criminal justice system.
98. Susan Bandes points out that "a legal process devoid of such 'soft' emotions
as compassion or mercy is not emotionless; it is simply driven by other passions."
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 11 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). The essays in this collection
describe some of those passions as vengeance, rage, contempt, disgust, and indigna-
tion - many of which seem to have gained a certain new legitimacy in the criminal
justice system. Perhaps it is not coincidental that mercy and compassion seem at the
same time to have lost their place as counterweights. Indeed, it may even be that
certain of the "hard" emotions have turned in judgment upon the "soft," so that
mercy is held in contempt and compassion looked on with indignation and disgust.
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